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Abstract: 
This study of US Navy Sea Air and Land (SEALs) commandos contributes to 
the research investigating mindfulness in High-Reliability Organizations 
(HROs) by identifying micro- and macro-level influences that allow SEALs 
to build capacity for mindful behaviors and flexible responses despite the 
complexity of their missions, unpredictability of their operating 
environments, and inherent danger of their work. Although HRO literature 
defines five hallmarks of mindfulness, how frontline people working in 
HROs create a state of collective mindfulness is not often investigated. This 
study addresses this gap through an empirical exploration of ‘mindfulness 
in action’ as a way to link individual mindfulness traits and organizational 
mindfulness influences, providing a more nuanced conceptualization of one 
hallmark of mindfulness—a preoccupation with failure—and offering a new 
sixth factor that allows HROs to perform in a near error-free manner: 
comfort with uncertainty and chaos. These discoveries open up new 
avenues of HRO research for a wide range of reliability-seeking 
organizations.  
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Mindfulness in Action: 
Discovering How U.S. Navy SEALs Build Capacity for Mindfulness 
in High-Reliability Organizations (HROs) 
 
ABSTRACT 
This study of US Navy Sea Air and Land (SEALs) commandos contributes to the 
research investigating mindfulness in High-Reliability Organizations (HROs) by 
identifying micro- and macro-level influences that allow SEALs to build capacity for 
mindful behaviors and flexible responses despite the complexity of their missions, 
unpredictability of their operating environments, and inherent danger of their work. 
Although HRO literature defines five hallmarks of mindfulness, how frontline people 
working in HROs create a state of collective mindfulness is not often investigated. 
This study addresses this gap through an empirical exploration of ‘mindfulness in 
action’ as a way to link individual mindfulness traits and organizational mindfulness 
influences, providing a more nuanced conceptualization of one hallmark of 
mindfulness—a preoccupation with failure—and offering a new sixth factor that 
allows HROs to perform in a near error-free manner: comfort with uncertainty and 
chaos. These discoveries open up new avenues of HRO research for a wide range of 
reliability-seeking organizations.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Although studies investigating performance reliability in organizations have a long 
history, research examining High Reliability Organizations (HROs) or organizations 
that perform in a near error-free manner despite their complex, unpredictable and 
dangerous operating environments is more recent (La Porte, 1996; Roberts, 1989; 
Rochlin, LaPorte, & Roberts, 1987; Weick, 1987). Aircraft carriers, nuclear power 
plants, and air traffic control towers are known for their standardized procedures, 
checklists, and other routinized organizing processes. Yet research by Weick and 
Roberts (1993), among others, reveals that these HROs’ consistent performance 
results less often from routines and more often from ‘organizational mindfulness’ 
processes—that is a capacity to detect and correct errors and adapt to unexpected 
events before small factors develop into catastrophic failures. Weick and Sutcliffe 
(2006, p. 516) further define HRO’s “mindfulness” as a “rich awareness of 
discriminatory detail” coupled with a “capacity for action”.  
Weick and Sutcliffe (2001, p. 10) observe successful HROs share five 
hallmarks of mindfulness: a preoccupation with failure, reluctance to simplify, 
sensitivity to operations, commitment to resilience, and deference to expertise. 
Building on this, Weick and Sutcliffe (2006, p. 516) provide a more detailed 
explanation: 
Small failures have to be noticed (preoccupation with failure) and their 
distinctiveness retained rather than lost in a category (reluctance to simplify). 
People need to remain aware of ongoing operations if they want to notice 
nuances that portend failure (sensitivity to operations). Attention also is 
crucial for locating pathways to recovery (commitment to resilience) and the 
expertise to implement those pathways (deference to expertise). 
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However, despite definitions such as these in the literature, we know little about how 
mindfulness is operationally achieved by frontline people working in HROs; a process 
that Weick (2011) notes, must be continuously re-accomplished in situ. That is, how 
do individual mindfulness traits and organizational mindfulness processes mesh to 
sustain reliable performance?  
In this study we provide novel empirical evidence regarding how mindfulness 
is enacted in a distinctive context. Through this exploration we extend the 
conceptualization of mindfulness paying greater attention to how mindfulness 
manifests itself at individual and organizational levels and through this analysis 
expand Weick and Sutcliffe’s (2001; 2006) hallmarks of mindfulness. Weick, 
Sutcliffe, and Obstfeld (2008) observe that HROs warrant closer attention in 
mainstream organizational theory because they are harbingers of organizational 
adaption in increasingly complex environments and can serve as role models of how 
mindful processes can foster organizational effectiveness and suppress tendencies 
towards inertia.  
Supporting this observation, HRO theories have been applied in less risky, 
‘reliability-seeking’ organizations such as a US business school (Ray, Baker, & 
Plowman, 2011), software firm (Vogus & Welbourne, 2003), and German 
manufacturer (Gebauer, 2012). The commonality in this research centers on 
recognition that, regardless of industry, no one can predict when or how the next 
unexpected challenge will emerge, or where Weick and Sutcliffe (2007, p. 90) note 
“ugly surprises are most likely to show up”. It is just universally agreed that they will. 
Therefore, a wide range of organizations can benefit from a clearer sense of how 
mindfulness is continuously re-accomplished in situ. 
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Navy SEALs  
To investigate this phenomenon, our research team conducted a novel multi-modal 
study of an elite military community: United States Navy Sea Air and Land 
commandos called SEALs. The Navy SEAL community was established by President 
John F. Kennedy in 1962 to enhance the US military’s unconventional warfare 
capability following the success of Underwater Demolition Teams on Normandy 
beaches and Pacific coral reefs during World War II. Named for the three 
environments in which they operate—Sea, Air and Land—SEALs provided a flexible 
maritime counterpart to the Army ‘Green Berets’, quickly establishing themselves as 
one of the toughest Special Operations Forces (SOF) in the world (Dockery, 2004). 
By researching Navy SEALS we are able to examine mindfulness at an individual 
level within an organization that demands near error free action. 
Central to SEAL training and development is completion of Basic Underwater 
Demolition/SEAL training known simply as BUD/S: an arduous, thirty week training 
course held at the Naval Special Warfare Training Center in Coronado, California 
where much of the present study’s research was conducted. A highlight of the BUD/S 
program is ‘Hell Week’, an event designed during World War II to quickly prepare 
frogmen for the Normandy beach landing, and includes five days of continuous 
training exercises in hypothermic environments along with intense sleep deprivation. 
The training objective of Hell Week is for SEAL candidates to demonstrate a ‘never 
quit’ attitude, regardless of assignment difficulty. Nonetheless, Hell Week is so 
demanding that about 75% of each BUD/S class typically quits by week’s end 
(Doolittle, 2004). Training culminates with a graduation ceremony where candidates 
become authorized to wear the coveted Trident pin, and the class elects its ‘Honor 
Man’: the trainee who most inspired others to overcome adversity to succeed. Even 
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for retired SEALs, a sense of pride and camaraderie as a navy commando remains 
deeply engrained and dozens often make the pilgrimage back to the Coronado training 
facility six times per year for SEAL graduation, our research team observed.  
HIGH-RELIABILITY ORGANIZATIONS (HROS) AND MINDFULNESS 
Karlene H. Roberts (1989) was perhaps the first scholar to propose that existing 
organizational theory offered little assistance deciphering the nearly error-free 
organizing processes of hazardous industries. Building on Perrow’s (1984) ‘normal 
accident’ theory identifying the vulnerabilities of highly technical, tightly coupled and 
interactively complex systems, Roberts (1989) coined the term ‘High Reliability 
Organization’ after she and her UC Berkeley colleagues noted how risky 
organizations sustained excellent performance over long periods despite the inherent 
danger of their work. Organizations were categorized as HROs based on how often 
they could have failed with catastrophic implications, yet did not. Roberts (1989, p. 
113) noted, “If the answer is ‘repeatedly,’ the organization qualifies for membership 
in the ‘high reliability’ group”.  
Initially some HRO theorists, such as Weick (1987), characterized HROs 
based on their total elimination of mistakes and inability to learn by trial-and-error 
due to the severe implications of failure. Yet, this stance was later reassessed to allow 
for the inevitability of error, preoccupation with failure, and the importance of trial-
and-error learning, albeit in a limited way (Weick et al., 2008). Another early HRO 
researcher, La Porte (1996) further defined HROs as organizations that must 
continuously operate at a very high level of efficiency using complex and hazardous 
advanced technologies without major failure while maintaining the capacity to 
address unpredictability. Similarly, Carroll’s (1998) HRO study found nuclear power 
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and chemical processing plants employ a unique organizational learning process cycle 
to avoid errors, limit the consequences of problems, and learn from near-misses and 
minor incidents. Other early studies cited HROs fixation on safety as the source of 
their reliability. Yet more recent research recognizes HROs actively pursue multiple 
objectives to achieve peak performance (Weick et al., 2008). 
What was novel about these pioneering studies was that prior to this time, 
studies of complex operations in hazardous industries often adopted an engineering 
presumption that performance reliability resulted from clear hierarchy, stable 
environments, unambiguous functions, and routinized procedures. In this paradigm, 
human operators were seen as a potential weakness and that vulnerability was 
controlled through engineering design, managerial supervision, and routinization. For 
instance, once a nuclear power plant was built and debugged, nuclear utilities and 
governmental regulators assumed the plant would simply run safely. Nuclear 
accidents were deemed too unlikely to worry about until the Three Mile Island 
meltdown in 1979 proved this logic flawed (Carroll, 1998).  
In contrast, early HRO researchers recognized that a new paradigm was 
needed in which reliability was equated with organizational flexibility, resilience, and 
responsiveness to the unexpected. As such, resilience resulted from organizational 
slack that allowed operators to continually manage small fluctuations and 
uncertainties, not from organizational invariance and tight managerial control 
(Schulman, 1993). Although Weick et al. (2008) observe HRO’s reliable outcomes 
are now understood to be the result of stable processes of cognition that detect and 
adapt patterns of activity in order to manage unexpected events, we still do not know 
how this is achieved exactly. Therefore to better understand how organizations 
organize for reliability, Weick et al. (2008) suggest, researchers should specify what 
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is done repeatedly and what varies in the service of discovery and correction of errors 
and unexpected events capable of escalation.  
Much of the recent research in the field has been applying the HRO concepts 
in the study of less dangerous workplaces. Termed ‘reliability-seeking organizations’, 
studies include a broad set of organizations in which human fatality is unlikely 
however their unpredictable operating environments nonetheless mean that small 
failures can amplify into organizational mortality (Vogus & Welbourne, 2003). 
Studies such as these have led scholars to observe that “organization literature has, on 
the one hand, been abuzz about the concept of organizational mindfulness,” Ray et al. 
(2011, p. 191) noted, “but relatively quiet when it comes to empirical demonstrations 
of the idea”. We aim to change that through this study of US Navy SEALs.  
MINDFULNESS IN ACTION DEFINED 
Weick et al. (2008, p. 37) explain that although there has been ample recognition that 
diverse cognitive processes are associated with high reliability functioning, how these 
diverse processes interrelate in a state they call “collective mindfulness” is less often 
investigated. To understand collective mindfulness, they note, it is important to 
consider not only where individual’s limited attention is allocated and what is noticed 
at the micro-level, but also how autonomous those individuals are empowered to be 
and what action is taken at the macro-level as a result. Therefore collective 
mindfulness involves inquiry, interpretation, sense-making, framing and reframing 
processes, and challenging assumptions within a repertoire of action capabilities 
(Fraher, 2011). As Weick et al. (2008, p. 37) note, “The richness of a state of 
mindfulness is determined by the richness of the action repertoire.” Yet we know little 
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more about what links individual processes at the micro-level and organizational 
processes at the macro-level to achieve this collective mindfulness in HROs.  
HRO literature explains that mindful organizing only exists to the extent that it 
is collectively enacted and continuously reconstituted, and this process is a function of 
the behaviors of organizational members (Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2012). As such, 
achieving organizational mindfulness involves both individual characteristics and 
organizational phenomenon within a given context. Yet, how these two levels 
interrelate is largely unaddressed in HRO studies. Through this study we address this 
gap by introducing ‘mindfulness in action’ as a way to link two previously distinct 
levels of mindfulness analysis: traits of individual mindfulness (See for example, Fiol, 
Pratt, & O'Connor, 2009; Kabat-Zinn, 1994; Langer 1989, 2000; Weick & Sutcliffe, 
2006) and a state of collective mindfulness at the organizational level (Weick & 
Roberts, 1993; Weick & Putnam, 2006; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001; Weick et al, 2008). 
Mindfulness in action occurs when HROs achieve an attentive yet flexible focus 
capable of incorporating multiple, sometimes competing realities in order to assess 
alternative solutions and take action in dynamic situations. Mindfulness in action is 
developed through attention to Weick and Sutcliffe’s (2001) five hallmarks of 
mindfulness as well as a new sixth factor: comfort with uncertainty and chaos. As 
such, mindfulness in action is a dynamic co-creational process between individuals, 
the organization, and the wider context and environment (See Figure 1).  
Micro-Level Influences 
Langer (2000, p. 220) offers one of the most often cited definitions of individual 
mindfulness: “mindfulness is a flexible state of mind in which we are actively 
engaged in the present, noticing new things and sensitive to context”. In addition, 
Kabat-Zinn’s (1994) observes that individual mindfulness involves paying attention in 
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a present, purposeful nonjudgmental way. More recently Fiol, Pratt, and O'Connor 
(2009) added that achieving mindfulness depends on individual’s openness to new 
information, ability to create new categories of meaning, and awareness of multiple, 
sometimes competing realities. In sum, individual mindfulness is based on several, 
often overlapping characteristics: 1) attention to detail; 2) engagement in the present; 
3) a flexible state of mind; and 4) openness to multiple emerging realities.  
In addition, quantitative researchers have studied other individual 
characteristics that may contribute, albeit in an oblique manner, to mindfulness such 
as the big five personality traits (BFF) (Goldberg, 1990), grit (Duckworth, Peterson, 
Matthews, & Kelly, 2007; Duckworth & Quinn, 2009), emotional intelligence (Bar-
On & Parker, 2000; Goleman, 1995; Salovey & Mayer, 1990), and resilience (Smith 
et al., 2008; Windle, Bennett, & Noyes, 2011), among others. For example, grit 
involves perseverance and passion for long-term goal achievement thereby creating a 
sense of purpose while resilience is a more immediate, short-term process of adapting 
to challenges and staying motivated. Both involve aspects of emotional intelligence 
which is an individual’s ability to understand and use emotional information to guide 
thinking and behavior. The point here is that mindfulness in action crystalizes a range 
of individual characteristics at the micro-level.   
Insert Table 1 About Here: Table of Terms 
Macro-Level Influences 
On a macro-level, HRO theory demonstrates that HROs achieve their high reliability 
through heedful performance, heedful interrelating, and other mindful organizing 
processes. For example, Weick and Roberts (1993) note heedful interrelating is an 
ongoing social process in which HROs capitalize on individual know-how to meet 
unexpected situational demands by identifying small failures before they build into 
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catastrophe. And heedful performance is the outcome of training and experience 
linked with thinking and feeling that allows HROs to flexibly apply knowledge in 
ambiguous situations. Yet how these important micro-and macro-level factors are 
linked to achieve high performance in HROs has been largely unexplored. 
Mindfulness in action crystalizes this range of micro- and macro-level influences 
demonstrating how overlapping traits such as grit, resilience, and emotional 
intelligence at the individual level, combine with organizational phenomenon such as 
heedful performance and heedful interrelating on the macro-level, to support 
collective mindfulness in HROs.  
Insert Figure 1 About Here: Unpacking Mindfulness 
Military mindfulness training 
Mindfulness has been previously studied in a military context, yet in a limited way. 
Following civilian studies such as Brown and Ryan (2003) which found that 
mindfulness training (MT) such as yoga, meditation, and reflexive exercises with 
undergraduate students often created a greater sense of focus and well-being, military 
researchers examined whether mindfulness training could similarly impact soldiers’ 
performance. For example, Stanley, Schaldach, Kiyonaga, and Jha (2011) tested 
whether MT prior to Iraq assignment could bolster U.S. Marines’ psychological 
resilience as a prophylaxis against deployment stressors. Jha et al. (2015) examined 
whether MT could reduce U.S. Army soldiers’ attention lapses and mind wandering. 
Meland, Fonne, Wagstaff, and Pensgaard (2015) investigated whether MT with pilots 
and mission support personnel in a Norwegian F-16 squadron could reduce anxiety 
and improve concentration. All of the studies reviewed reported success, albeit 
minimal, by measuring military members’ perceptions of the impact of MT on their 
individual thoughts and feelings (e.g. ‘The training has really opened my eyes’; ‘I 
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have become more calm and relaxed’; ‘I feel I can concentrate more easily’). Yet, 
none of this military research addressed the aim of the present study to examine how 
HROs such as US Navy SEALs build capacity for the mindfulness required to 
succeed in the complex unforgiving environments in which they operate. 
 
Insert Figure 2 About Here: Overview of Multimodal Research Design 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
This qualitative study used a multi-modal research design consisting of three phases: 
ethnography, text analysis, and videography (See Figure 1). Perhaps as far back as 
Campbell and Fiske (1959), authors recommend researchers employ several different 
methods as part of a validation process that ensures that the study’s findings are the 
result of the reported phenomenon. Torrance (2012) notes mixed methods research 
attempts to consider multiple viewpoints thereby providing novel opportunities for 
validation by offering ways to compare interpretations across data sources in order to 
triangulate research findings. Following Denzin (1978), we adopted four triangulation 
methods: (a) data triangulation using a variety of data sources; (b) investigator 
triangulation using three different researchers; (c) theory triangulation combining 
multiple theories to interpret findings; and (d) methodological triangulation adopting 
a multi-modal research design. Several scholars have recently argued multimethod 
research is so popular it should join quantitative and qualitative approaches as a ‘third 
methodological community’ because of these advantages (Johnson, Onwuegbuzie, & 
Turner, 2007; Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2010; Torrance, 2012).  
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Phase One 
The first phase of our study investigated how mindfulness is developed by analyzing 
data gleaned from semi-structured interviews with US Navy SEALs; exploratory 
unstructured interviews with SEAL instructors, SEAL candidates, and SEAL spouses 
and other family members; and observations of several training evolutions and a 
graduation ceremony at SEAL training facilities, after which detailed field notes were 
recorded. Twelve semi-structured interviews were conducted with three active duty, 
three reserve, and six retired US Navy SEALs in California. Interviews ranged from 
56 minutes to almost two hours in duration, and resulted in the creation of fifteen and 
a half hours of transcription data. Extensive field notes were treated as additional yet 
no less significant empirical data. 
Contact with study participants was initially made via an email introduction by 
a mutual colleague of the first author, a retired SEAL now working in academia, and 
then through ‘snowball sampling’ other participants were identified (Goodman, 
1961). Informants were all volunteers interviewed by the first author between May 
and December 2013, during their off-duty time. After providing informed consent, 
interviews were digitally recorded and then fully transcribed.  
Participants were all men, in ranks from Master Chief (E-9) to Captain (O-6), 
ranging from 34 to 70 years in age, with between eight and thirty years of military 
service. Although six participants (50%) began their careers as enlisted men all except 
for one were officers at the time of the interview. Five had earned a direct officer 
commission, four had attended the Naval Academy, and two were commissioned 
through Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC). Four participants (25%) had served 
during the Vietnam-era, or shortly thereafter, the remaining eight (75%) had recent 
experience in Iraq and/or Afghanistan warzones. In sum, informants were all senior 
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military members with extensive experience in Naval Special Warfare, half of whom 
had worked their way up from the lowest enlisted military ranks to earn an officer 
commission.  
Informants were articulate, outspoken, eager to tell their stories, and interested 
in the study topic and research findings. The first author’s years of experience as an 
H-46 helicopter pilot—an aircraft often used for SEAL transport—provided common 
ground. As a result a sense of trust quickly developed and informants were candid, 
reflective, and detailed when sharing information. Like many professionals discussing 
their career with a fellow professional, they responded with enthusiasm and, at the 
end of the interviews, spontaneously offered additional insights and raised numerous 
questions of their own. The initial scope of the study sought to explore how 
professionals working in high-risk fields made sense of unusual and potentially 
escalating crisis situations. A semi-structured interview schedule was used as a guide 
but overall interviews were non-directive and participants were encouraged to talk 
about their lives, careers, families, feelings, and other experiences both inside and 
outside the military.  
In order to ensure a high level of reliability and validity in the study, all 
transcripts were fully transcribed and manually coded using the Nvivo computer 
software program. The textual dataset totaled over 133,000 words and analysis took 
the form of an interpretive thematic coding, drawing on elements of grounded theory 
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Using an inductive research approach, the research team 
identified the key themes that the informants themselves emphasized as important in 
coping with extreme contexts and coded these quotes using informants’ own words 
such as ‘learning through failure’ and ‘quitting is not an option’. To maintain the 
integrity of the original texts, several readings of the data were undertaken and the 
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codes and sub-codes that were adopted were discussed extensively within the research 
team in order to ensure inter-rater reliability. In sum, our approach was consistent 
with the emerging reflexive approach in qualitative inquiry in which researchers seek 
to question their own values and assumptions, their active role in the field work, and 
the stake they have in the findings and interpretations (Cunliffe, 2003).  
Phase Two 
Through this process, two broad themes clearly emerged from the dataset: ‘comfort 
with uncertainty and chaos’ and a ‘positive orientation towards failure’. The aim of 
phase two of the study was to discover more about these two themes. Our research 
team wondered: Is comfort with uncertainty and chaos and a positive orientation 
towards failure an inherent trait of those selected as SEAL candidates or does SEAL 
training create—or at least heighten—this characteristic? To investigate this question, 
a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request was submitted to the Naval Special 
Warfare Command in Coronado in March 2014 requesting access to all government 
studies investigating SEAL recruitment, selection, and training processes. In response, 
twenty seven documents were provided totaling over 600 pages of empirical material. 
Our research team reviewed these documents using a text-based analysis approach 
during phase two of our study (See Table 2).  
Insert Table 2 About Here: Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Request 
 
Although some areas of these documents were redacted as ‘protected under the 
deliberate process privilege’ and ‘for internal use only’, the data available was 
nonetheless revealing. We found that several SEAL candidate screening measures are 
in use, yet none screen for attitudes towards uncertainty, chaos, or failure, or similar 
HRO mindfulness characteristics.  
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Phase Three 
With our interest further piqued, our research team went back to the drawing board to 
consider the availability of other empirical materials to help us investigate the ways 
uncertainty, chaos, and failure might emerge during BUD/S training. We discovered 
that over six hours of government sponsored SEAL marketing and recruitment videos 
were publically available on the internet. Designed to provide potential SEAL 
candidates with accurate information about BUD/S training and expectations, we 
realized that these real-world documentaries could prove to be a fruitful data source. 
Therefore, phase three of our study included an analysis of these videos (See Table 3).  
Insert Table 3 About Here: Sources of Videography 
‘Re-purposing’ of video footage, that is adopting pre-existing videos from 
television broadcasts, ‘home-made’ videos, CCTV, or internet websites for use as a 
data source has increased as the availability of recording devices has spread (Jewitt, 
2012). Several researchers note the need to expand contemporary research practices to 
include more visual research and that a linguistic turn may have gone too far in 
establishing the primacy of language in empirical studies of organizations (See for 
example, Bell & Davison, 2013; Lefsrud, Graves, & Phillips, 2016; Liu and Maitlis, 
2014). In response, the use of publically available web-based videos from sources 
such as youtube has emerged as a viable research area. However, extant studies 
predominantly focus on the various characteristics, practices, and motivations of the 
websites’ users rather than offering methods of analysis of the videos themselves 
(Adami, 2009; Soukup, 2014). 
Smets et al. (2014) report important advantages in using video as an empirical 
data source such as allowing researchers to study individuals in their natural setting 
without being present thereby reducing the potential for observer bias and enhancing 
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accessibility to hard-to-reach populations. Admittedly, the Navy videos used here 
were created from documentary-like footage for marketing purposes so the material 
available was not unbiased. Yet, research supports that re-purposed video data such as 
this nonetheless offers researchers the advantage of being a durable, malleable, 
shareable record that can be repeatedly viewed and edited in multiple ways. These 
advantages become particularly important for studies involving dangerous or 
restricted contexts such as the present study, shining light on previously off limit 
environments such as SEAL training. 
Although there were not many models to follow from organization studies for 
the analysis of our re-purposed video, other fields provided some guidance. For 
example, visual design research in the field of visual sociology analyses a range of 
human-made artefacts as a data source, including videos. Margolis and Pauwels 
(2011) observe visual research serves two purposes: to help observers make sense of 
the surrounding world and to provide a lens into the design process itself, providing a 
variety of visual and tactile means of doing research. In addition, Knoblaunch and 
Schnettler’s (2012) hermeneutical model from the communication field informed our 
inductive process.  
First, we repeatedly watched approximately six hours of online video footage 
listed in Table 3. Then, using an inductive research approach, similar to the coding 
process described in phase one, we identified video segments representing uncertainty 
and failure. The final stage of our analysis process required reviewing the coded 
material to identify patterns and three concepts emerged as the basis for 
categorization: physical failure, mental failure, and team failure. Short video segments 
were identified, copied and spliced into one larger video using Camtasia, a video 
editing computer software program. Overtime, sixteen minutes of key video clips 
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were identified as representational (Please see https://vimeo.com/153223681 ). This 
multi-stage process enabled our research team to observe both the physical and verbal 
reactions of Navy SEAL candidates and their instructors during the BUD/S training 
process. Through this sequential video analysis technique, “the temporal unfolding of 
action produces meaning situationally”(Knoblaunch & Schnettler, 2012, p. 354). 
DISCOVERIES 
Text-Based Analysis 
The text-based analysis phase of our research predominantly draws on the FOIA 
materials as well as several Special Operation Force studies conducted by military 
officers at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey California (See for example, 
Allman, Fussell, & Timmons, 2012; Doolittle, 2004); Ferguson, 2012; Hoffman, 
2003; Mourouzis, 2011; Swierkowski, & Burrell, 2002) and secondary sources such 
as newspaper articles, professional military magazines, and internet resources. 
Reviewing this material, our research team discovered that after September 11th 2001 
Special Operation Forces were extensively deployed to Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen and 
other volatile regions because many of the highly specialized missions of the Global 
War on Terror could not be accomplished by conventional military forces (NSW 
Center Public Affairs, 2010). In response, the Pentagon doubled the Special 
Operations budget to $10.5 billion and the Navy aimed to expand the SEAL 
community by 15%.  
Although increased efforts have been made to actively recruit skilled 
candidates and better prepare them for the challenges of BUD/S, the attrition rate has 
nonetheless remained stubbornly high. Of the 900 candidates recruited to attend 
BUD/S annually, only about 25% will successfully pass to become SEALs at a cost of 
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approximately $350,000 per trainee (Taylor, Miller, Mills, Padilla, & Hoffman, 
2006). High attrition rates, coupled with an ever-increasing demand for Special 
Operations personnel in the operational theater, present a unique and significant 
human resource challenge for the SEAL community. Yet there has only been a 
modest investigation into the key mental characteristics predicting performance 
success of BUD/S candidates.  
As far back as the 1950s research focused on easily quantifiable measures in 
what was then called ‘frogman’ training, examining physical characteristics and 
fitness levels in an attempt to establish a predictive statistical model for graduates and 
drop-outs. Fifty years later studies continue to focus on age, weight, swim score and 
run time reporting that older, heavier recruits with faster run times and better 
swimming skills were more likely to graduate from BUD/S; but only by about 10 
percent (Aleton, Cohen, Cummings, & Gray, 2002). This led researchers to deduce 
that mental characteristics must play a more important role than they previously 
suspected and researchers attempted to develop methods to screen BUD/S candidates.  
For example, McDonald, Norton, and Hodgdon (1988) administered the 
Hogan Personality Inventory and found that successful SEAL recruits scored higher 
than drop outs in self-confidence, composure under pressure, amicability, 
courteousness, and even temperedness. Braun, Prusaczyk, Goforth, and Pratt (1994) 
administered a five factor survey (NEO Personality Inventory) comparing SEAL 
recruits to males in the general population in five categories: conscientiousness, 
neuroticism, extraversion, agreeableness, and openness. Findings revealed that 
SEALs scored lower than the general population on neuroticism, indicating they are 
less prone to feelings of depression and vulnerability, and higher on aspects of 
extraversion such as excitement seeking and assertiveness. Another quantitative study 
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compared SEAL candidates to other navy recruits and found that successful SEAL 
trainees had greater confidence, motivation, estimation of their abilities, commitment 
to the service, and support from family and friends (Harris et al., 2007).  
In 2010, a $500,000 Gallup study reported that successful SEAL candidates 
conducted extensive research about the SEAL community such as reading SEAL 
books and memoirs, watching documentaries and fictional military movies, and 
conducting internet research. In contrast, unsuccessful SEAL trainees reported that 
they thought they would give BUD/S ‘a try’ and came in less physically fit and 
mentally prepared (Gallup, 2010). Gallup also found that young men who grew up in 
New England, played water polo, enjoyed chess, and personally knew someone from 
Special Operation Forces were the most likely candidates to succeed in SEAL 
training.  
In response, new recruitment strategies and mentoring programs were 
developed, and new recruit screening measures were evaluated (Ferguson, 2012; 
Steele, March 5, 2010). For example, Mills and Held (2004) correlated military entry 
criteria such as scores on the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) 
and physical fitness tests with BUD/S graduation rate. More recently, the Navy 
Computer Adaptive Personality Scales (NCAPS) was developed to assess thirteen 
personality traits in order to screen all navy recruits into a range military occupations. 
Oswald, Shaw, and Farmer (2015) report NCAPS is still in the testing phase however, 
once approved as the navy’s occupational screening tool, it may prove to be the best 
selection instrument for future Navy SEALS. Although researchers reported “that 
existing training predictors are too low in validity and/or important predictors of 
training success are not being accounted for in the selection process” (Mills & Held, 
2004, p. 3), new predictive models have been slow to emerge. As a result, finding and 
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training the right individuals for the job continues to prove challenging and the SEAL 
community remains critically undermanned as they struggled with a new role: 
marketing their elite commando program for the first time in history (Allman, Fussell, 
& Timmons, 2012; Mourouzis, 2011; Swierkowski & Burrell, June 2002).  
In sum, quantitative studies repeatedly demonstrated, perhaps unsurprisingly, 
that SEALs differ from other men in specific ways such as self-confidence, 
composure, even temperedness, motivation, commitment, excitement seeking, and 
assertiveness. Yet, researchers concede, it is difficult to discern the roots of these 
findings. The lure of excitement and danger might attract SEAL recruits who are 
predisposed to succeed in the challenging BUD/S environment. Conversely, SEAL 
training and the military environment might influence recruits’ personality, for 
example, building their confidence, assertiveness, and thrill-seeking. New quantitative 
measures exploring SEAL candidates’ orientation towards uncertainty, chaos, and 
failure might prove to be helpful screening tools, allowing the navy to identify and 
select recruits with a higher propensity to survive BUD/S training and become 
successful SEALs. In addition, a clearer focus on identifying and developing 
mindfulness skills might reduce attrition by helping recruits hone their abilities during 
training. Nevertheless, little attention has been paid in quantitative studies thus far to 
the individual mindfulness characteristics identified as essential to success in HROs. 
Interviews 
A pivotal finding early in the ethnographic phase of our research was that it is widely 
accepted amongst SEALs that their success is less dependent on individual physical 
prowess and more dependent on mental characteristics. For example, every informant 
mentioned dedication, determination, motivation, and resilience as essential to 
SEALs’ success. Yet, not one informant mentioned physical attributes such as 
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running speed, swimming endurance, or weight lifting strength as critical. One SEAL 
explained it this way:  
People usually think being a SEAL is this intense physical challenge, which 
there certainly are components of. But most guys who graduate from BUD/S 
are not physical specimens. I mean, they are above average physically. But all 
the guys who I went through training with who were the fastest runner, the 
fastest swimmer, the strongest—all of the really elite athletes—college 
quarterbacks, Olympic athletes…Those guys usually dropped out fairly early 
in the program and it wasn’t at all because they were physically exhausted or 
challenged…What I think that points to is more mental characteristics than 
physical.   
[SEAL 3] 
This discovery caused our research team to wonder: if outstanding physical skills 
were not the key to SEAL success then what qualities were. 
After reviewing the field notes, we noted that the SEALs we studied confided, 
reflected, and self-analyzed, candidly expressing strong opinions while also 
unabashedly sharing stories full of paradox, ambiguity, and inconsistencies. 
Untroubled by these contradictions, informants were comfortable discussing chaotic, 
confusing, and complex situations with little need for tidy closure or rational 
conclusions. In addition, field notes documented common SEAL slogans that reflect 
the contradictions inherent in SEAL operations: “Get comfortable being 
uncomfortable” and “Embrace the suck”.   
We discovered that by acknowledging these contradictions, SEALs were able 
to mentally prepare for the uncertainty and danger of their work and consider the 
ramifications of completing the tasks required of them in a mindful way before 
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embarking on their mission. One SEAL explained his mental preparation process this 
way:  
You have to be comfortable with yourself [to succeed as a SEAL]…I didn’t 
just go through that training and then go ‘OK, what’s the next thing another 4 
mile run’? I went home and spent days contemplating, imagining, going 
through scenarios [considering what I might be asked to do]…You may be 
asked to put a garrote around some guy’s neck just because he’s in the way 
and we have to get through the fence…He could be a great guy. But I’m sorry 
you’re in the way….I want to be okay with that now, so I don’t have to deal 
with that after…Mentally and Spiritually. 
[SEAL 5] 
Therefore, a key to SEALs’ ability to accomplish their missions is that they 
were unencumbered by feelings of trepidation or mental angst that might preclude 
them from being fully present. Applying Weick and Sutcliffe’s (2006, p. 516) mindful 
definition, we found SEALs demonstrated a rich awareness of discriminatory detail 
and a capacity for action by mentally preparing for and acknowledging the wide 
variety of challenges that they might encounter during the course of their work.  
 
Insert Tables 4, 5 & 6 About Here: Unpacking the Attributes 
 
Analysis of our data revealed a range of ways in which mindfulness was 
enacted by SEALs and subsequently played a role in achieving high reliability. Of the 
themes identified (See Tables 4,5 and 6) , the strongest evidence was in relation to 
embracing, and even thriving, under uncertainty and chaos and viewing failure as a 
learning opportunity. Nearly every SEAL described how unpredictability and chaos 
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had a calming influence over them, signaling a need to shift focus to the challenges of 
the immediate present:  
I can predict that something will unpredictably happen here shortly…That’s 
the way life is, you can’t stop it. Something is going to happen, so if it’s going 
to be outrageously bad then you have to deal with it [now]…Suddenly it 
rockets you into this chaos but it’s [comforting]…I have nothing else to worry 
about. There’s no other priority. I don’t have to worry about getting my taxes 
done on time [laugh] because it doesn’t matter. 
[SEAL 2] 
Expecting unpredictability, SEALs readily acknowledged that the best made 
plans are nonetheless just “a basis for change”, as one SEAL described it. Therefore, 
when things go wrong SEALs are unflustered. In fact, several SEALs described how 
they thrive on the challenge of unpredictability. For example, when asked to provide a 
specific example of how he deals with chaotic environments, one SEAL described his 
tour of duty during the Arab Spring in 2011: 
In Yemen, it was just this constant process of not knowing what’s going on in 
this kind of evolving situation where every day—minute by minute, hour by 
hour things were changing…We evacuated all non-essential personnel but 
maintained a small presence [at the Embassy]…You had no idea what was 
going to happen next….I don’t know how to characterize this but I thrive on 
change. I would prefer to be in an environment that is chaotic or changing or 
uncertain because I think that it presents an opportunity to do something, to 
excel, or to respond probably in a place where a lot of people are going to 
struggle and be frustrated with it.  
[SEAL 3] 
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What is important to emphasize is that SEALs are not put-off by unpredictable 
challenges but rather calmly reorient by recognizing not every contingency can be 
anticipated and chaotic environments present their own unique opportunities to excel. 
One SEAL provided an example from his Afghanistan deployment experience:  
Most SEALs are adaptable and this is one of the greatest qualities of the 
SEAL community above other special operations units and above 
conventional units…I say that confidently, just having observed it…They say, 
“Oops, we need to send half of your platoon to Afghanistan; a third of them 
are going to Yemen and the other—the remainder is going to hang out in Iraq. 
But we’re going to marry you up with an East Coast SEAL team and you guys 
are just going to have to figure it out”. So I think SEALs adapt well and it is 
one of our greatest strengths to think outside the box and deal with anything.    
[SEAL 12] 
As one senior SEAL training officer explained, adaptability and comfort with 
uncertainty is developed early in SEALs when they are encouraged to innovate in 
their training. This philosophy is, paradoxically, reinforced through repeated exposure 
to failure: 
The way we inculcate a [SEAL] mindset and ethos is through failure. We are 
allowed to fail, in a controlled environment. You know the old expression: 
you learn more from your failures than your successes? That’s very much part 
of the culture. You fail a lot [laugh]. And you’re intended to fail. Because part 
of it is, how do you measure up? Can you bounce back from it?  
[SEAL 10] 
Another senior SEAL officer described how he thought about failure and 
mindfulness: 
Page 24 of 48Academy of Management Discoveries
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
25 
 
That’s happened to me a couple of times, when things were not going right 
and it looked like I was going to fail. At that point I got really focused—these 
are the things that aren’t going right. And I’ve got to really put my energy into 
it…I’m afraid of failure because I didn’t prepare well. I’m not afraid of failure 
if I did the best I could….And if I do fail, am I going to have done the best I 
could and learn from it?   
[SEAL 1] 
 
In sum, we found that SEALs’ develop the mindfulness required to excel in 
their complex operating environments because they possess a high level of comfort 
with uncertainty and chaos that allows them to innovate, experiment, and even fail as 
long as they prepared as much as possible, gave their best effort, and learned from the 
experience. Learning from failure implies a willingness to take risks and embrace 
unconventional thinking; another important skill reported by nearly every informant. 
As one senior SEAL officer characterized it, a key SEAL skills is “the ability to look 
at a situation and say what can go wrong?” and then build potential solutions while 
simultaneously recognizing that these plans will likely change.  
Videography 
The last phase of our research capitalizes on the Navy’s efforts to expand their 
marketing materials after 2001 by using publically available documentary style SEAL 
recruitment videos (See Table 3). Our research team discovered that during SEAL 
training, candidates were forced to grapple with failure on a daily basis, contributing 
to their emerging comfort with chaos and uncertainty. We suspect that this experience 
taught SEAL trainees how to learn from non-fatal failure in a controlled training 
environment as a way to avoid fatal failure in their future operating environments. 
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Over time three categories emerged: 1) physical failure; 2) mental failure; and 3) team 
failure.  
Physical failure 
The first category in which SEAL candidates are pushed to learn from failure is based 
on individual challenges such as timed runs, swims, and other physical demands. In 
addition to meeting prescribed time limits, students are urged to continually beat their 
own ‘personal best’ times and compete with each other to win races in order to show 
steady improvement. Although it may not seem surprising to expect continuous 
progress, physical tests continue to be administered under increasingly challenging 
conditions such as during Hell Week with its intensive sleep deprivation. Failing to 
meet minimum standards, no matter what the context, will result in a drop from SEAL 
training. It is not uncommon for an individual to excel in one area such as running and 
struggle in others such as calisthenics or swimming and SEAL instructors are quick to 
notice any mental weakness when candidates’ physically falter (See video segment).  
Mental failure 
The second category in which SEAL candidates are pushed to learn from failure is 
based on mental challenges during which students are forced to struggle with their 
individual doubts and insecurities. For example, SEAL instructors may confront a 
student for ‘not demonstrating leadership’ or ‘not putting out’ and giving 100 percent 
effort. Employing slightly different tactics, instructors might ask if a SEAL candidate 
officer was ‘worthy of leading men’ or suggest that ‘there are other programs out 
there’ which the student might consider, since he appears not up to the standards of 
being a SEAL.  
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Team failure 
The third category in which SEAL candidates are pushed to learn from failure in a 
controlled setting is based on the challenge of working within a team under duress. 
Examples in this category are boat crews’ inability to follow directions, coordinate 
activities and execute as a team, not meeting timed evolutions, and the constant 
pressure to beat other boat crews at whatever the assigned challenge. First place 
finishers are ‘winners’, and often get to rest, while second place finishers are merely 
the ‘first loser’ and join the other losers for more exercises. 
Although each of the failure categories is described separately, it is important 
to emphasize that they are not experienced as stand-alone events by participants. For 
example, a SEAL candidate may be urged to quit BUD/S by a SEAL instructor who 
observes that the student is ‘too weak’ to complete his push-ups (failure 1), ‘not 
putting out’ (failure 2), and letting his boat crew down by making them wait for him 
to finish (failure 3). The SEAL candidate develops an increased ability to tolerate 
uncertainty by this experience because he is unsure himself if, in fact, he has the 
strength and stamina to complete more push-ups and if his boat crew will continue to 
respect him if he makes them late. In contrast to a ‘preoccupation with failure’, the 
SEAL candidate is forced to focus on providing his best effort in the moment and not 
fixate on the ‘what-ifs’ of his potential failures. 
Examples of learning through failure such as these abound in BUD/S. For 
instance, SEAL candidates must jump into a swimming pool, flip underwater, and 
then complete a timed 50 meter underwater swim without kicking off the wall or 
taking an additional breath. Students are closely monitored by divers because in 
several cases automatic reflexes take over causing the swimmer to inhale water and 
pass out. To successfully pass in the time allocated (overcome failure 1), SEAL 
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candidates must learn to control their anxieties about drowning (overcome failure 2) 
and trust instructors will monitor their safety (overcome failure 3). 
In sum, a review of the video data in phase three reveals SEALs likely develop 
comfort with uncertainty through repeated exposure to non-fatal failure in training as 
a way to avoid fatal failures on the frontline. Overtime, SEALs develop a calmness 
and focus during uncertainty and chaos that contributes to a positive orientation 
towards failure suggesting one way HROs may develop mindfulness in uncertain 
environments.  
DISCUSSION 
The aim of this study was to identify the ways in which Navy SEALs develop the 
mindfulness required by their complex, unpredictable and dangerous operating 
environments. We discovered that risky, chaotic and ambiguous HRO environments 
which would cause most people to become anxious, frustrated, and fearful, signal 
SEALs to become mindful, shifting their attention to the immediate present and 
heightening their sense of alertness for the unanticipated and awareness of multiple, 
sometimes competing realities. During this shift, the priority becomes achieving only 
the most immediate goal; one more evolution, one more push-up.  
Previous HRO research identified the connection between HROs and chaos at 
the organizational level. Yet, nearly all researchers assumed chaos potentially 
undermined reliability and performance and therefore needed to be contained. For 
example, Roberts (1990, p. 168) referred to the aircraft carrier flight deck as 
“organized chaos” because flight operations involved tightly coupled systems 
operating with extreme interdependence in uncertain environments making them 
vulnerable. Similarly, Vidal and Roberts (2014, p. 18) noted how US firefighters use 
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Incident Management Teams “to bring ‘order to chaos’” and French firefighters 
described their job as “organizing chaos”. Comments such as these reflect a sense that 
chaos should be organized and contained not embraced, lest it influence the reliability 
of high-risk teams’ performance. In contrast, discoveries in this study support that 
mindfulness in action allows Navy SEALs to live comfortably and even thrive with 
chaos, uncertainty, and change, without the need to ‘bring order’ and resolve 
inconsistencies. For SEALs, chaotic environments seem to trigger mindfulness in 
action in ways that improved performance and reliability by allowing them to focus 
intensely on the present, disregarding outside distractions.  
Similarly, we discovered that embedded within SEALs mindful organizing 
processes is the freedom to innovate, experiment, and even fail in a controlled 
environment, as long as they gave their best effort and learned from the experience. 
Most HRO studies note how the catastrophic repercussions of mistakes in the HRO 
environment prohibit learning from trial-and-error and instead emphasize how 
organizational reliability is increased through a ‘preoccupation with failure’. Typical 
examples of this preoccupation include an organizational willingness to reward the 
discovery of error, a proactive reporting of ‘bad news’, and an ability to keep small 
mistakes from escalating (Gartner, 2013; La Porte, 1996; Ray et al., 2011; Weick & 
Sutcliffe, 2001).  
However, what was discovered in this study was a different preoccupation—a 
focus on learning through failure and then moving on. SEALs learned though 
repeated failure in a controlled setting how to adapt to an uncertain situation and 
impending failure triggers mindfulness processes that have not previously been 
discussed in HRO research. For example most HRO studies support Weick et al.’s 
(2008, p. 39) observation that “worries about failure are what give HROs much of 
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their distinctive quality” and by that they note “HROs are preoccupied with 
something they seldom see”. Yet, SEALs in this study failed often and were not 
preoccupied with avoiding failure in that manner. Rather, SEALs intense focus on 
learning in the present allowed them to shrug off failure and move on to the next 
event.  
For example in our videography, a SEAL instructor chastises a recruit who 
just failed an important timed run. The bare-chested recruit is standing at attention, 
completely covered in sand, and the instructor calmly explains:  
“It looks like the only thing out of this timed run that you’re going to end up 
benefiting from is the fact that now you know what it means to be wet and 
sandy… You know it now, because you failed the run and we got you sandy. 
So you’ll still end up benefitting in one little way.” 
This discussion helps reveal how SEALs can be both attentive to failure yet not 
become immobilized by the potential repercussions of failing—a connection that has 
not been extensively investigated in HRO theory. Instead, observations that HROs are 
‘preoccupied with failure’ have been largely unchallenged in part because it is so 
difficult to separate individual and collective characteristics in the analysis.  
One thing that is clear: SEAL recruits know that the likelihood of successfully 
completing BUD/S is extremely low. They know they will be repeatedly pushed to 
the brink and forced to fail, because the fastest runner may not be the strongest during 
calisthenics or swimming [see video for examples]. Yet, successful SEALs often 
report ‘quitting was never an option’. What this indicates is that SEALs are not 
‘preoccupied by failure’, as Weick and Sutcliff (2001; 2006) note. Rather they have a 
positive orientation towards failure as an opportunity to identify a weakness, learn, 
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and grow stronger. A subtle, yet distinctly different perspective that warrants further 
research.  
Revisiting Weick and Sutcliffe’s (2006, p. 516) explanation of the five 
hallmarks we add: Successful HRO’s foster an organizational climate at the macro-
level that allows individuals to develop comfort with uncertainty and chaos at the 
micro-level. Rather than being preoccupied with failure, we find that some HROs 
develop a positive orientation towards failure as an opportunity to identify a 
weakness, learn, grow stronger, and then move on; the opposite of preoccupation. For 
instance, SEALs in this study demonstrated that they can be both attentive to failure 
yet not become immobilized by the potential repercussions of failing. These 
developments are able to occur because, as Weick and Sutcliffe note, a reluctance to 
simplify, sensitivity to operations, commitment to resilience, and a deference to 
expertise. 
CONCLUSION 
Quantitative research has shown that individual traits such as grit, resilience, and 
emotional intelligence are important factors that contribute to individuals’ success at 
the micro-level. In addition, HRO theory demonstrates that HROs achieve their high 
reliability through heedful performance, heedful interrelating, and mindful organizing 
at the macro-level. Yet how these important micro-and macro-level factors are linked 
to achieve high performance in HROs has been largely unexplored. This paper offers 
one of the first examinations of the ways that individual mindfulness traits at the 
micro-level and organizational mindfulness at the macro-level interrelate in HROs in 
a process we call mindfulness in action (See Figure 3).  
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Insert Figure 3 About Here: Unpacking Mindfulness 
 
Through a study of US Navy SEALs, we provide a more nuanced conceptualization 
of one of Weick and Sutcliffe’s (2001; 2006) five hallmarks of mindfulness—a 
preoccupation with failure—and identified a sixth hallmark of mindfulness that 
allows SEALs to perform in a near error-free manner despite the complexity, danger, 
and unpredictability of their operating environments: comfort with uncertainty and 
chaos. Most HRO studies observe that the catastrophic repercussions of mistakes 
prohibit learning from trial-and-error and instead emphasize how organizational 
reliability is increased through a ‘preoccupation with failure’.  
In contrast, findings in the present study reveal that embedded within SEALs 
mindful organizing processes is the autonomy to fail and move on, as long as they 
gave their best effort and learned from the experience. These findings parallel sports 
psychology studies which report that athletes who can put mistakes behind them 
report more effective coping skills and greater motivation than those that dwell on 
failures (Mouratidis & Michou, 2011). SEALs learned though repeated failure in a 
controlled setting how to adapt to uncertainty and chaos and during this process 
mindfulness processes are triggered in ways that have not previously been identified 
in HRO research. We discovered that SEALs ability to reconfigure mistakes into a 
learning experience ensures that they do not become immobilized by the potential 
repercussions of failing in their risky operating environments.  
IMPLICATIONS AND NEW RESEARCH TERRITORY 
Mindfulness is an important phenomenon to study because a wide range of 
organizations today must navigate complex, unpredictable environments that pose a 
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significant risk to the organization’s survival. As such, Vogus, Rothman, Sutcliffe, 
and Weick (2014, p. 592) observed “mindful organizing is relevant to organizations 
of all kinds”. Similarly, Gebauer (2012, p. 203) explained managers and management 
scholars can learn a lot from mindful organizing because, in contrast to rationality-
based management paradigms, mindful organizing “provides the guiding principles 
and proactive managerial mind-set to build collective organizational capabilities for 
anticipating the evolution of unexpected events and acting resiliently in times of 
crisis”. Therefore, the discoveries presented in this article open-up new territory for 
organizational research and practice with implications for a wide range of high-
performing, reliability-seeking organizations (Vogus & Welbourne, 2003).  
One of the most intriguing discoveries of this study is the fact that some 
individuals do not just succeed in ambiguous and chaotic contexts but positively 
thrive in them, seeking out uncomfortable situations that most of us try to avoid. 
Rather than focusing energy on containing the chaos in these environments, we 
discovered chaos-thrivers tap into cues which trigger an increase in mindfulness that 
fosters creative leadership processes that lead to innovative solutions. In contrast to a 
presumption that reliability results from stable hierarchical environments in which 
human operators are controlled through close supervision and rigid procedures, we 
discovered a flexible less hierarchical approach improved performance in ambiguous 
environments by enhancing mindfulness. Understanding the nature of these dynamics 
more clearly would not only expand HRO theory but perhaps help the Navy select 
more suitable candidates for SEAL training. 
Although recent studies have applied HRO resiliency frameworks, particularly 
Weick and Sutcliffe’s (2001) popular five hallmarks of mindfulness model in the 
study of less physically risky workplaces, the rich discoveries reported here support a 
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return to the study of high-risk fields in order to surface clues further identifying the 
links between reliability and mindfulness. After all, if we can manage to maintain 
high levels of safety, reliability, and success in HRO environments such as nuclear 
safety, aviation and, in this case Navy SEALs, it is likely that equivalent levels of 
high performance are achievable within a wide range of reliability-seeking 
organizations in less risky contexts.  
LIMITATIONS 
Although we believe that the multimodal research approach adopted here offers novel 
yet reliable insights about our research question, we recognize there are limitations in 
our research design. First, interview results were based on a small informant group of 
very experienced SEALs who volunteered for the study and were therefore not 
randomly selected. Second, some of the text-based materials analyzed in phase two 
were redacted for security purposes making some documents only partially usable. 
Third, although much of the video analyzed in phase three was documentary footage 
gathered during actual SEAL training, the footage was edited and narrated for a 
different purpose by the Navy and therefore not unbiased. In addition, some critics 
believe that the mere presence of a video recording device distorts social interaction 
to such a great extent, video as a data source is of little empirical value (Jewitt, 2012). 
That said, other researchers claim this issue is exaggerated and empirically 
unsubstantiated, and within a short time, the camera is hardly noticed by video 
participants (Heath, Hindmarsh, & Luff, 2010). In addition, video re-purposing is an 
emergent research approach with few models to refer to for guidance within the field 
of organization studies. Finally, although we adopted Weick and Sutcliffe’s (2006) 
definition of HRO mindfulness as a rich awareness of discriminatory detail and a 
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capacity for action, we recognize that some readers may have difficulty accepting our 
application of mindfulness to military operations. For example, Kabat-Zinn’s (1994, 
p. 7) popular definition based on Buddhist influences describes mindfulness as 
“gentle, appreciative, and nurturing”, not likely descriptors for Navy SEALs. 
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Term Definition Key References 
Heedful Performance Heedful performance is the outcome of training and experience linked with thinking and feeling, creating 
an ability to apply knowledge flexibly in ambiguous situations  
Weick and Roberts (1993) 
Heedful Interrelating Heedful interrelating is an ongoing social process that capitalizes on individual know-how to meet 
unexpected situational demands by identifying small hard to see or believe failures before they build into 
catastrophe. 
Weick and Roberts (1993) 
Mindful Organizing Mindful Organizing results from a preoccupation with failure, reluctance to simplify, sensitivity to 
operations, commitment to resilience, and deference to expertise. 
Weick and Sutcliffe (2001) 
Individual Mindfulness Mindfulness is active refinement of existing distinctions, creation of new categories, and nuanced 
appreciation of alternative ways 
Langer (1989) 
 Mindfulness is paying attention in a present, purposeful nonjudgmental way Kabat-Zinn (1994) 
 Mindfulness is flexible state of mind, actively engaged in present noticing new things Langer (2000) 
 Mindfulness requires high level of attentiveness and capacity to respond to unanticipated cues in order to 
carry out novel action in flexible manner. 
Levinthal and Rerup (2006) 
 Mindfulness is a rich awareness of discriminatory detail coupled with a capacity for action. Weick and Sutcliffe (2006) 
 Mindfulness depends on openness to new information, ability to create new categories of meaning, and 
awareness of multiple, sometimes competing realities.  
Fiol et al. (2009) 
Resilience Resilience is process of negotiating, managing and adapting to change, stress or trauma while staying 
motivated.  
Windle et al. (2011) 
Reliability Reliability is capacity to produce collective outcomes of certain minimum quality repeatedly and 
achieved through highly standardized routines. 
Hannan and Freeman (1984) 
Emotional Intelligence Emotional intelligence is ability to understand your own emotions and those of others and use emotional 
information to guide thinking and behavior  
Salovey and Mayer (1990); 
Goleman (1995) 
Big 5 Personality Traits  Conscientiousness, neuroticism, extraversion, agreeableness, openness Goldberg (1990) 
Grit Grit involves perseverance and passion for long-term goals. Duckworth et al. (2007); 
Duckworth and Quinn (2009) 
Table 1: Table of Terms  
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Figure 1: Unpacking HRO Mindfulness at Micro- and Macro-Levels of Analysis 
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Figure 2: Overview of Multimodal Research Design  
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Topic Year 
Total 
pages 
1 NSWC Pre-Training Questionnaire Unknown 8 
2 Selection & Training of BUD/S Instructors 1979 40 
3 SEAL Training Profile Questionnaire 1990 10 
4 Training Success in US Navy Special Forces 1990 8 
5 
Profiles of Exercise History and Overuse Injuries among US Navy 
SEALs 1994 6 
6 
So You want to be a Frogman? Determining what it takes to become a 
US Navy SEAL 2002 10 
7 NSWC Consulting Report on SEAL Database Analysis 2002 34 
8 Individual characteristics related to SEAL training success Unknown 14 
9 Metacognition in BUD/S training 2003 14 
10 BUDS Attrition A Review of Past Research and Current Practices 2002 26 
11 Point Paper - Costs to Train a SEAL Operator 2005 4 
12 USN SEALs Candidate Profile Study 2005 20 
13 CENSEALSWCC - BUDS Candidate Histories Unknown 38 
14 The Thomas Group - Macro Assessment Outbrief - CFTs 2006 3 
15 
Prediction of BUDS Retention Using the ExamCorp Assessment 
Process 2006 6 
16 SEAL Production Process Improvement Program 2007 48 
17 NSW Final Research Findings (Gallup) 2009 48 
18 NSW Psych Description Successful BUDS Students 2010 25 
19 Appendix High Potential BUDS Candidates 2009 48 
20 Importance of Activities Preparing you for SEALs 2009 34 
21 
Profiles of Exercise History and Overuse Injuries Among SEAL 
Recruits 1994 8 
22 
Thermal and Physiological Responses of BUDS Students to a 5.5 Mile 
Open Ocean Swim  1993 26 
23 Personality Profiles of US Navy SEAL Personnel 1994 20 
24 
Adaptations to the Three Weeks of Aerobic Anaerobic Training in West 
Coast US Navy SEALs 1994 20 
25 The Effect of Hypoxia and Cold at Rest on Human Thermoregulation 1996 16 
26 
Determinants and Effects of Training Success in US Navy Special 
Forces 1988 20 
27 Physical Demand of US Navy SEAL Operations 1995 60 
   
614 
Table 2: Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Request Empirical Material 
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Title Description Weblink Time 
Navy SEAL Life 
After the Teams 
Interview with Professor, former 
US Navy SEAL 
http://www.SEALswcc.com/navy-
SEALs-videos.html#.VjdFmytK4zF 
5:28 
Navy SEAL Life 
After the Teams 
Interview with Astronaut, former 
US Navy SEAL 
http://www.SEALswcc.com/navy-
SEALs-videos.html#.VjdFmytK4zF 
3:47 
BUD/S Class 224 Videography of BUD/S instructors 
and Navy SEAL recruits in training 
http://www.SEALswcc.com/navy-
SEALs-videos.html#.VjdFmytK4zF 
14:52 
BUD/S-1st Phase  Videography of BUD/S Day One 
Selection events 
http://www.SEALswcc.com/navy-
SEALs-videos.html#.VjdFmytK4zF 
1:47 
BUD/S-1st Phase  Videography of BUD/S first phase 
of training  
http://www.SEALswcc.com/navy-
SEALs-videos.html#.VjdFmytK4zF 
2:41 
BUD/S-1st Phase  Videography of BUD/S Hell Week  http://www.SEALswcc.com/navy-
SEALs-videos.html#.VjdFmytK4zF 
2:26 
BUD/S-2nd Phase  Videography of BUD/S Combat 
Diving training 
http://www.SEALswcc.com/navy-
SEALs-videos.html#.VjdFmytK4zF 
1:30 
BUD/S-3rd Phase Videography of BUD/S Land 
Warfare training 
http://www.SEALswcc.com/navy-
SEALs-videos.html#.VjdFmytK4zF 
2:02 
BUD/S Class 274 Videography of BUD/S instructors 
and Navy SEAL recruits in Land 
Warfare training 
http://www.SEALswcc.com/navy-
SEALs-videos.html#.VjdFmytK4zF 
3:40 
Navy SEALs 
BUD/S Class 234 
Part 1 – ‘Welcome To BUD/S’: 
Videography of BUD/S instructors 
and Navy SEAL recruits 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
wQFRePXMI9M 
45:58 
Navy SEALs 
BUD/S Class 234 
Part 2—‘It pays to be a winner’: 
Videography of BUD/S instructors 
and Navy SEAL recruits 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v
dV3tsH1GB4 
45:58 
Navy SEALs 
BUD/S Class 234 
Part 3—Two weeks and one long 
day 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Il
16BaBAuv0 
45:58 
Navy SEALs 
BUD/S Class 234 
Part 4—Hell Week https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2
CiYEksYQq0 
49:54 
Navy SEALs 
BUD/S Class 234 
Part 5—The only easy day was 
yesterday 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c
2hS1TYYfA0 
49:08 
Navy SEALs 
BUD/S Class 234 
Part 6—The home stretch https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g
oE_tJaSplk 
49:17 
 
Table 3: Sources of Empirical Video Material 
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Table 4: Attributes of Individual Mindfulness linked with Extant Literature—Template Coding 
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Table 5: Attributes of Collective Mindfulness from Interview Data – Emergent Coding 
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Table 6: Attributes of Collective Mindfulness from Interview Data - Template & Emergent Coding  
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Figure 3: Mindfulness in Action 
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